Chemical process safety at a crossroads. by Merritt, Carolyn W
December 2004 will mark the 20th anniversary of the worst indus-
trial accident in history, the chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India,
that killed thousands of people and injured tens of thousands more.
Along with other safety professionals from around the world, I will be
traveling to India this fall to reflect on what has changed and what we
still must do to better protect the lives of workers and the public
from chemical accidents.
Chi (χ), the 22nd letter of the Greek alphabet, is an ancient sym-
bol of a crossroads. At its center, the intersection point, or chiasm,
marks a single event that separates past from future. Bhopal is a
chiasm, an event that forever changed the path of the chemical
industry and that continues to be felt around the world.
Thousands of Bhopal victims suffered permanent, disabling
injuries, which they must live with every day. The tragedy has also
changed public attitudes toward the chemical industry in lasting ways.
The U.S. Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (1986), followed by the Clean Air Act
Amendments (1990). These laws have established a federal role in
overseeing how companies manage the safety of chemical processes on
a daily basis.
As directed by Congress, the U.S. Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA 1992) and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA 1996) issued regulations requiring
companies to analyze the hazards of their processes, preserve safety
during process changes, perform preventative maintenance, train
workers and contractors, investigate safety incidents, and plan for
emergencies. The rules do not require specific safety equipment or
define an acceptable level of risk to workers or the public, but they do
require companies to establish broad safety management systems
before processing various hazardous chemicals. As radical as the rules
were in some ways, in one important respect they were decidedly con-
ventional: to be covered under the standards, a facility needs to use at
least a threshold quantity of one of approximately 100 enumerated
chemical substances or classes. Thus most chemical processes today
are not covered under the safety rules.
Beyond mandating new regulations, the Clean Air Act
Amendments (1990) authorized creation of a new independent federal
agency, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(CSB), which investigates the root causes of serious chemical acci-
dents that harm workers or the public. Governed by a board of five
safety experts appointed by the president and confirmed by the
Senate, the CSB has the authority to recommend needed safety
improvements to the U.S. EPA, OSHA, industry, and other organiza-
tions, based on its investigations of accidents and hazards. Although
the CSB was not funded until 1997, it is currently a fully operational
body that investigates up to a dozen major chemical accidents each
year and reports its findings to the public and Congress.
One ongoing purpose of the CSB is to evaluate just how effective
OSHA and U.S. EPA process safety regulations are. Virtually since
the CSB opened its doors, members began to realize that these rules
had potentially serious gaps. The rules address hazards of individual
chemicals, such as flammability, toxicity, and instability, but not the
hazards of chemical reactions. Controlled chemical reactions are
essential to manufacturing, but uncontrolled reactions have led to
numerous accidents. For example, a chemical reaction can “run
away” if excess heat is generated and not removed quickly enough.
Uncontrolled reactions can generate gases that cause explosions or
toxic releases. Other serious accidents
are caused by inadvertent mixing of
incompatible substances.
About one-third of the major acci-
dents the CSB has investigated since
1998 are these “reactive” accidents—
where a sudden, uncontrolled chemical
reaction causes deaths, injuries, or serious
damage. The following are among the
more notorious examples:
• On 8 April 1998, an explosion and fire occurred during the produc-
tion of a dye at a chemical plant in Paterson, New Jersey (CSB 2000).
The blast resulted from a runaway chemical reaction that began when
reactants were overheated. The explosion injured nine employees and
showered a residential neighborhood with hazardous chemicals.
• On 19 February 1999, a process vessel containing several hundred
pounds of highly reactive hydroxylamine exploded at a start-up
chemical firm near Allentown, Pennsylvania, destroying the facility
and killing four plant workers plus the manager of a nearby business
(CSB 2002a).
• On 13 March 2001, three workers were killed as they opened a
process waste vessel full of hot plastic at a polymer manufacturing
plant in Augusta, Georgia (CSB 2002b). Unbeknownst to the work-
ers, the waste plastic had been decomposing over a period of hours,
generating gas and building up dangerous pressure inside the vessel.
• On 16 January 2002, two workers were killed and eight others
injured when deadly hydrogen sulfide gas was released from a
process sewer at a rural Alabama paper mill (CSB 2002c). The gas
had formed due to a reaction of spilled sodium hydrosulfide solution
with acidic wastewater in the sewer.
As diverse as these events are, they share many common features
(CSB 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). First, all these accidents involved
known chemistry, which had already been described in the literature.
In several cases, similar incidents that occurred previously at the same
facilities should have been more thoroughly investigated. In three of
the cases (CSB 2000, 2002b, 2002c), the chemical processes were
exempt from both OSHA and U.S. EPA process safety rules, and in
the other instance it was ambiguous whether the process was legally
covered (CSB 2002a).
In some ways reactive hazards are as broad as chemistry itself,
but preventing most reactive accidents is not an insurmountable
challenge. In many cases, we have found that companies have not
invested the time necessary to thoroughly understand the hazards of
their processes. Plant managers need to review the chemical litera-
ture, analyze different accident scenarios, take near-miss incidents
seriously, and implement safety changes. In other words, they
should follow good safe-operating practices for industrial-scale
chemistry.
Faced with a growing list of accidents, the CSB conducted a
nationwide study of reactive accidents going back to 1980. The
results were striking: 167 serious accidents in the United States
alone, together responsible for more than a hundred deaths as well
as numerous injuries and huge property losses (CSB 2002d). Most
of these accidents involved chemicals not currently covered under
the process safety rules. Because of deficiencies in national accident
data, many other serious accidents may not have been included in
this study.
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Perspectives EditorialIn September 2002, the CSB voted unanimously to call on
OSHA and the U.S. EPA to broaden their process safety rules to
better regulate reactive hazards. The majority of the CSB members
voting for the new rules were former industry safety managers. Both
industry and the regulatory agencies are taking this problem seriously
and have committed to a variety of initiatives, including increased
guidance and outreach.
Although worthwhile, these voluntary programs do not benefit
companies that only do the minimum that is legally required. It is
time for us to raise the standards for all businesses that have reactive
hazards. For companies that already have strong safety programs,
our recommended changes will add little burden. For companies
that do not, new rules may well save workers’ lives and protect the
owners from financial ruin.
The Bhopal catastrophe was itself a reactive accident involving
inadvertent mixing of incompatible chemicals, a runaway decom-
position reaction, and finally a devastating toxic gas release. As we
approach the 20th anniversary of this disaster, we are once more
nearing a crossroads; this time, we should be enlightened enough
to close remaining safety loopholes without waiting for more 
accidents.
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